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Decision making is impacted by uncertainty and risk
(i.e., variance). Activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, an
area implicated in decision making, covaries with
these quantities. However, this activity could reflect
the heightened salience of situations in which
multiple outcomes—reward and reward omission—
are expected. To resolve these accounts, rats were
trained to respond to cues predicting 100%, 67%,
33%, or 0% reward. Consistent with prior reports,
some orbitofrontal neurons fired differently in antici-
pation of uncertain (33% and 67%) versus certain
(100% and 0%) reward. However, over 90% of
these neurons also fired differently prior to 100%
versus 0% reward (or baseline) or prior to 33%versus
67% reward. These responses are inconsistent
with risk but fit well with the representation of
acquired salience linked to the sum of cue-outcome
and cue-no-outcome associative strengths. These
results expand our understanding of how the orbito-
frontal cortex might regulate learning and behavior.
INTRODUCTION
Decision making is impacted by uncertainty and risk (Bach and
Dolan, 2012; D’Acremont and Bossaerts, 2008; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1984; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). Recent reports
have claimed that activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) repre-
sents these variables (Kepecs et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz,
2010). Yet while the activity of some neurons in these studies
did covary with risk or uncertainty, the overall pattern of the firing
of these neurons was also consistent with the representation of
acquired salience, which is elevated in response to uncertain
predictors of reward (Pearce and Hall, 1980; Pearce et al., 1982).
Often risk (or the closely related concept of uncertainty) and
acquired salience are confounded. However, their signaturesdiverge if one compares firing to certain reward and certain
nonreward. This divergence occurs because the risk associated
with certain reward and nonreward, defined as the mathematical
variance in the probability (or amount) of reward (D’Acremont
and Bossaerts, 2008), is equivalent and in fact zero (i.e., no
risk), whereas the acquired salience of certain reward is
clearly higher than that of certain nonreward (Mackintosh,
1975). Thus, neurons that represent risk should fire similarly
and near baseline in both conditions, while neurons that repre-
sent salience should show higher activity in anticipation of
certain reward than certain nonreward. Here we tested these
predictions.RESULTS
Risk-Responsive Orbitofrontal Neurons Fail to Conform
to Specific Predictions for the Representation of Risk
We trained rats in a simple odor-cued response task (Figure 1A).
Each trial was initiated by illumination of a house light, after
which nose poking at a central odor port resulted in presentation
of a 500 ms odor cue. After termination of the odor cue, the rats
were required to unpoke from the odor port and respond at
a nearby fluid well to receive a sucrose reward. The reward
was delivered after a 1 s delay, termed the outcome anticipation
period. One of four odors was presented on each trial, associ-
ated with 100%, 67%, 33%, or 0% probability of reward.
Importantly, rats had to respond at the fluid well on every trial
for the task to proceed. Odor-reward associations were kept
the same throughout the experiment. The rats were trained
4 weeks prior to recording.
During recording, rats exhibited differences in movement
latency and licking during the outcome anticipation period
(Figures 1B and 1C), consistent with an understanding of the
reward associations. Specifically, the rats moved to the fluid
well after odor offset much more quickly in anticipation of
possible reward (100%, 67%, and 33%) than in anticipation
of certain nonreward (0%) (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U test,
Figure 1B). They also licked more frequently while waiting in
the fluid well on these trial types (p < 0.001, Mann-WhitneyNeuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 251
Figure 1. Task Design, Behavior Perfor-
mance, and Recording from the Orbitofron-
tal Cortex
(A) Schematic illustrating sequence of events in
the task. (B) Average latency from odor offset to
responding at the fluid well (***p < 0.001, Mann-
Whitney U test). (C) Average number of licks during
1 s after well entry (***p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U
test). Error bars represent SEM. (D) Raster plots
and time histograms showing activity in an OFC
neuron aligned to the time of response at the fluid
well on trials involving 100%, 67%, 33%, or 0%
probability of reward. (E) Recording sites in the
lateral orbital (LO) cortex and agranular insular (AI)
cortex. Shaded boxes indicate approximate
extent of recording sites. We recorded 32, 222,
and 78 neurons from rats 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
(F) Mean firing rate of the unit shown in (D) as
a function of reward probability. Rates were
calculated during the outcome anticipation period
(1 s) across the session. Error bars represent SEM.
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Orbitofrontal Neurons Track SalienceU test, Figure 1C). Rats also responded more quickly and licked
more as reward became increasingly uncertain (33% and 67%
versus 100% and 0%, p < 0.0001 in movement latency; p <
0.001 in number of licks, Mann-Whitney U test, Figures 1B and
1C), consistent with the higher salience of these trial types.
These behaviors were stable during recording (see Table S1
available online).
We recorded the activity of 332 single units in the OFC in 37
sessions in three rats (Figure 1E). Recordings were located in
the lateral orbital cortex in rats 1 and 2 (total 254 neurons) and
from the agranular insular cortex in rat 3 (total 78 neurons)
(Figure 1E). In accord with prior reports (Kepecs et al., 2008;
O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), we found a population of neurons
(n = 120/332, 36.1%) in which firing seemed to reflect risk during
the outcome anticipation period (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U test).
Of these, 53 fired more while the rats were waiting for uncertain
(or risky) (i.e., 33% and 67%) than certain (or nonrisky) reward
(i.e., 100% and 0%) (Figures 1D, 1F, 2A, and 2C), and 67 showed
the opposite pattern (Figures 2B and 2D).
Yet, while the firing of these neurons met this simple predic-
tion for the representation of risk, their overall activity did not
conform to more specific predictions of this hypothesis. For
example, while these neurons fired more (or less) prior to uncer-
tain than certain reward, they also fired differently in anticipation
of certain reward (i.e., 100%) and certain nonreward (i.e., 0%;
Figures 2A–2D), two conditions in which risk should have been
negligible. This was reflected in the distribution of index scores
comparing the firing of each neuron during the outcome antici-
pation period on these two trial types (i.e., 100% versus 0%),
which were shifted significantly off zero (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, Figures 2E and 2F). Indeed 76 of the 120 risk-252 Neuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.responsive neurons (63.3%) exhibited
firing that differed significantly in anti-
cipation of 100% and 0% reward (29
neurons for 100% > 0%, 47 neurons for
0% > 100%, p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney
U test, Figures 2E and 2F).Importantly, the difference in the firing to certain reward and
certain nonreward typically reflected a change from baseline
(1 s immediately preceding house light on) in anticipation of
certain reward (34 neurons for 100% > baseline, 62 neurons
baseline > 100%, p < 0.05); these neurons typically did not
alter firing from baseline in anticipation of certain nonreward
(13 neurons for 0% > baseline, 28 neurons baseline > 0%, p <
0.05) (Figure 2). Thus, these neurons’ failure to conform to this
prediction was not due to some artifact introduced by the inclu-
sion of the 0% trials. Rather it was because these neurons
showed strong responses to certain reward when risk should
be negligible.
In addition, these same neurons also tended to increase
(Figures 1D, 1F, 2A, 2C, and 2G) or decrease (Figures 2B, 2D,
and 2H) firing during the outcome anticipation period as reward
became increasingly unlikely (i.e., 33% versus 67%). This
tendency did not reach significance for the neurons that sup-
pressed firing (Figures 2D and 2H), perhaps due to the already
low average firing rates (2.34 spikes/s). However, the difference
was highly significant for the neurons that increased firing. The
distribution of index scores comparing firing during this period
on these two trial types (i.e., 33% versus 67%) was shifted
significantly above zero (p < 0.01, Figure 2G), and nine of 53
individual neurons (17.0%) exhibited significantly higher firing
prior to 33% than 67% reward.
Overall, the pattern of activity described above is inconsistent
with the representation of risk, since risk should be unchanged
from baseline in anticipation of certain reward and certain non-
reward and equally high in anticipation of 33% and 67% reward.
In fact, across the above analyses (i.e., 100% versus 0%, 33%
versus 67%, and/or 100% versus baseline), only 11 of the 120
Figure 2. Risk-Sensitive Orbitofrontal Neurons Fail to Conform to
Specific Predictions for Representation of Risk
(A and B) Time course of average peak-normalized firing rates in risk-
responsive neurons ([33% and 67%] > [100% and 0%] or the opposite,
respectively, p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U test) on trials associated with different
probabilities of reward (blue, 100%; orange, 67%; red, 33%; cyan, 0%) aligned
to responding at the fluid well. Shading represents SEM. (C and D) Average
firing during the outcome anticipation period (1 s) as a function of reward
probability for 53 neurons shown in (A) and 67 neurons shown in (B), respec-
tively. Error bars represent SEM. (E and F) Distribution of activity indices
contrasting average firing in anticipation of 100% versus 0% reward during
the outcome anticipation period. Activity indices were calculated as follows:
(firing rate in anticipation of 100% reward [‘‘100’’]  firing rate in anticipation
of 0% reward [‘‘0’’]) / (‘‘100’’ + ‘‘0’’) for (E) or (‘‘0’’ – ‘‘100’’) / (‘‘0’’ + ‘‘100’’) for (F)
(blue bar, neurons that fired significantly more in anticipation of 100% than
0% reward; cyan bar, neurons that showed the opposite pattern, p < 0.05,
Mann-Whitney U test). The distributions were shifted significantly above zero
(p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). (G and H) Distribution of activity indices
contrasting average firing in anticipation of 33% versus 67% reward during
the outcome anticipation period. Activity indices were calculated as follows:
(firing rate in anticipation of 33% reward [‘‘33’’] – firing rate in anticipation of
67% reward [‘‘67’’]) / (‘‘33’’+ ‘‘67’’) for (G) or (‘‘67’’ – ‘‘33’’) / (‘‘67’’ + ‘‘33’’) for (H)
(red bar, neurons that fired significantly more in anticipation of 33% than 67%
reward; orange bar, neurons that showed the opposite pattern, p < 0.05,
Mann-Whitney U test). The distributions were shifted above zero (p value is
from Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
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Orbitofrontal Neurons Track Salienceof the apparent risk-responsive neurons met this stricter defini-
tion for the representation of risk (9.2%). Thus, while our
approach identified neurons in which firing differed in anticipa-
tion of risky versus nonrisky reward, as described in earlier
reports (Kepecs et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), it also
revealed that the firing in these neurons largely failed to conform
to more specific (and quite simple) a priori predictions for the
representation of risk or uncertainty in our task.
OFC Neurons Track Acquired Salience
What then might these neurons be representing? One possibility
is that these neurons are tracking the heightened salience asso-
ciated with both certain and uncertain reward. For decades,
learning theorists have shown that the salience (i.e., the ability
of a stimulus to capture attention) of reliable predictors is greater
than that of poor predictors, while predictors of uncertain
outcomes also acquire high levels of salience (Le Pelley, 2004;
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Pearce et al., 1982).
Recently, Esber and Haselgrove (2011) have proposed a model
that reconciles these apparently contradictory influences of
predictiveness and uncertainty by proposing that an event’s
salience reflects that event’s overall or combined associative
strength. At the heart of this new model is the notion that the
unexpected omission of reward is an emotionally potent
outcome as capable of contributing to salience as reward itself
(Konorski, 1967; Papini et al., 2006).
Following the Pearce-Hall model (Pearce and Hall, 1980;
Pearce et al., 1982), Esber and Haselgrove (2011) assume that
when a cue is probabilistically reinforced, occasional pairing of
the cue and the outcome will lead to the formation of a cue-
outcome or CS-US association. Once the outcome becomes
expected on the basis of the cue, however, occasional omission
of the outcome will encourage the formation of a second asso-
ciation, in this case between the cue and the emotional
consequences of outcome-omission, such as frustration or
disappointment. This association is referred to as the cue-
no-outcome or CS-noUS association. Notably, a critical tenet
of themodel is that association with omission can be established
only when there is association with reward, so the CS-noUS
association for certain nonreward is zero.
For the purpose of determining acquired salience (ε), the CS-
US and CS-noUS associative strengths combine to produce
additive effects. At asymptote (i.e., in well-trained animals such
as those in the current study), the model is reduced to:
ε= fðCS-US+wðCS-noUSÞÞ
where f is amonotonically increasing function, and (CS-US +w
(CS-noUS)) is combined associative strength where w is the
relative weighting of these two components.
The Esber-Haselgrove model makes several interesting
predictions relevant to the current data. First, a cue that predicts
certain reward should have a higher salience or associative
strength than a cue that predicts certain nonreward. Second,
cues predictive of both reward and reward omission (i.e., cues
that are reinforced probabilistically) should acquire still higher
salience. And third, the acquired salience of a cue rewarded
33% of the time should be higher than that of a cue rewardedNeuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 253
Figure 3. The Acquired Salience Model Better Explains Activity of
OFC Neurons than the Risk Model
(A and C) Distribution of variance in firing rate explained (adjusted R2) by
addition of both the CS-noUS and CS-US regressors from the acquired
salience model (A) or by addition of both the risk and CS-US regressors from
the risk model (C), after the effects of behavior latencies and number of licks
were accounted for; bar with orange (A) or green (C), count of neurons whose
variance in firing was explained significantly (p < 0.05) by the CS-noUS (A) or
the risk (C) regressor, respectively; gray bar, variance was not explained
significantly; number with orange (A) or with green (C), total number of the
neurons in each group. Spike counts of all task-responsive neuronswere taken
from the outcome anticipation period (1 s). (B) Comparison of variance in firing
rate explained by the CS-noUS and CS-US regressors from the acquired
salience model versus the risk and CS-US regressors from the risk model;
orange or green circle, a unit whose variance in firing was explained signifi-
cantly only by the CS-noUS or the risk regressor, respectively; yellow circle,
a unit in which variance in firing was explained significantly both by the CS-
noUS and the risk regressors; gray circle, neither; number with yellow, total
number of the neurons in the corresponding group. The distribution of variance
explained below 0.1 is magnified. (D) Distribution of the difference between
variance explained by both the CS-noUS and CS-US regressors versus that
explained by both the risk and CS-US regressors. The difference was calcu-
lated for each of the task-responsive neurons as follows: (variance explained
by risk and CS-US) minus (variance explained by CS-noUS and CS-US). The
distribution was shifted significantly below zero (p = 3.610, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test).
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254 Neuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.at 67%, at least after some experience (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for formal description of the full
model). A brief inspection of Figure 2 shows that these predic-
tions are congruent with the pattern of activity in OFC neurons.
To test more formally whether OFC neurons might track
acquired salience better than risk, we fit linear regressionmodels
for acquired salience or risk to the firing of each task-responsive
neuron during the outcome anticipation period (282 neurons, see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for definition). The
‘‘acquired salience’’ model included two critical regressors for
the CS-US and CS-noUS associations, defined as [1, 0.67,
0.33, 0] and [0, 0.33, 0.67, 0], respectively, for [100%, 67%,
33%, 0%] probability of reward. For comparison, the ‘‘risk’’
model included both the CS-US regressor and a risk regressor,
defined as [0, 1, 1, 0]. The inclusion of the CS-US regressor
allowed comparison of the two models without changing the
number of regressors and parameters (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures for the detail of the regression analysis).
This comparison showed that the variance explained by the
acquired salience model was significantly greater than that ex-
plained by the risk model (p = 3.610, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, Figure 3D). The superiority of the acquired salience model
was evident across a range of metrics, including Akaike’s
information criterion (AIC), partial correlation, and leave-one-
out cross-validation (Table S2). The conclusion was the same
even when the analysis included all recorded neurons (332
neurons) (p = 5.910) and when log or square root transformed
spike counts were used (p < 1.09).
We next computed the number of neurons in which variance
in firing was significantly explained by the addition of the
critical regressors that differentiated the two models: the CS-
noUS regressor from the acquired salience model and the risk
regressor from the risk model. This analysis identified 123
neurons in which variance in firing was explained significantly
by addition of the CS-noUS regressor (Figure 3A, p < 0.05).
The activity of 97 of these neurons could also be explained by
the addition of risk (Figures 3B and 3C). This overlap occurs
because the CS-noUS and the risk regressors are very similar
([0, 0.33, 0.67, 0] versus [0, 1, 1, 0]). However, consistent with
our initial analysis of risk-responsive neurons, nearly all of these
neurons violated predictions for the representation of risk.
Indeed, only five of the 112 neurons in which variance was ex-
plained by risk in our regression analysis exhibited equivalent
firing in anticipation of risky (33% versus 67%) and nonrisky
(100% and 0%) reward.
The result of the regression analysis shows that when added
as independent terms to a regression model, the terms in
acquired salience model (CS-noUS and CS-US) outperform
those in risk model (risk and CS-US) in accounting for firing in
OFC neurons. However, if these neurons really represent
acquired salience, rather than its component parts, then their
activity should reflect the sum of the CS-US and CS-noUS
associations. Consistent with this, we found activity in 129 of
282 task-responsive neurons was explained significantly by the
CS-US regressor (Figures 4A and 4B), while activity in 123
neurons was explained significantly by the CS-noUS regressor
(Figures 4B and 4C). These populations included 90 neurons in
which activity was explained significantly by both regressors
Figure 4. Acquired Salience, Reflecting the Sum of CS-US and CS-
noUS Regressors, Is the Critical Factor in Explaining OFC Neurons’
Firing
(A and C) Distribution of the regression coefficients of the CS-US (A) or CS-
noUS (C) regressor from the acquired salience model that was fitted to the
activity of each of 282 task-responsive neurons; bar with blue (A) or orange (C),
count of neurons in which variance in firing were explained significantly (p <
0.05) by addition of the CS-US or the CS-noUS, respectively; gray bar, not
significant. Total number of the neurons significantly explained by the CS-US
(A) or the CS-noUS (C) regressor is shown with blue and orange, respectively.
(B) Comparison of the regression coefficients of the CS-US regressor versus
that of CS-noUS regressor across all task-responsive neurons (blue or orange
circle, a unit whose variance in firing was explained significantly only by the
CS-US or only by the CS-noUS, respectively; magenta circle, both; gray circle,
neither; number with magenta, total number of the neurons in the corre-
sponding group. Three units (11.22, 6.24), (11.83, 14.73), and (18.28,18.66)
for (CS-noUS, CS-US), whose firing were explained significantly by both
regressors, are not shown for visualization.
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Orbitofrontal Neurons Track Salience(chi-square test, c2 = 66.12, p = 4.2516), including 89 that had
the same signs for the two regression coefficients (i.e., posi-
tive-positive or negative-negative, Figure 4B). Variance in firing
explained by the addition of the CS-US and CS-noUS increased
steeply in these neurons fromwell entry until the time of potential
reward delivery, consistent with signaling of information about
outcomes (Figure S1). Interestingly, the regression coefficients
of the CS-noUS association were significantly larger than those
for the CS-US across all 282 task-responsive neurons (p <
0.05, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) (i.e., w > 1, Figure 4B), consis-
tent with the ordering of the specific values for acquired salience
(33% > 67% > 100% > 0%) predicted by the Esber-Haselgrove
model. This pattern was also apparent in the average firing rates
of individual neurons (Figure S2).
DISCUSSION
That the firing of a substantial population of OFC neurons
differed in anticipation of uncertain (or risky) reward versuscertain (or nonrisky) reward is consistent with prior single-unit
(Kepecs et al., 2008; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010) and imaging
studies (Tobler et al., 2007). However, contrasting their activity
on trials in which risk or uncertainty was held constant while
the likelihood of reward and nonreward varied revealed that
only a very small handful of these neurons (five out of 282 task-
responsive neurons, 1.8%) met a principled definition for risk
encoding. While this small percentage may be compatible with
that of at least one prior report (i.e., 45 responses out of 1,083
task-related responses, 4.2%) (O’Neill and Schultz, 2010), it
did not rise above the level of chance in any of our analyses.
Nor was the firing of these neurons better explained by a
combination of the value of the reward (i.e., CS-US) and its
potential risk. While this explanation would capture the apparent
reward-responsiveness of these neurons and their higher (or
lower) firing to risky reward, it would also predict higher activity
in anticipation of 67% than 33%reward. An inspection of Figure 2
shows that this was not the case for the risk-responsive neurons.
Instead, their activity increased as reward omission became
more likely. The result of the regression analysis also shows
that value plus risk does not account for the data better than
acquired salience.
Notably, acquired salience, as exploited here, also predicts
the results obtained in previous studies that have reported
single-unit correlates of risk and uncertainty in the OFC. The first
is the study by O’Neill and Schultz (2010), which showed that the
firing of OFC neurons covaried with the variance (or risk) in
reward magnitude. Of course, shifts in the size of reward are
only effective to the extent that the animal perceives them.
Thus, they amount to the presentation of more or less reward
than expected, on average, after a given cue. Within the context
of the Esber-Haselgrove model, this is similar to what occurs
when reward is presented or omitted on a probabilistic basis;
in each case, the model predicts the formation of both CS-US
and CS-noUS associations and, therefore, greater combined
associative strength—and salience—for cues alternately rein-
forced with high- and low-value reward (Figure 5A). Consistent
with this interpretation, in the O’Neill and Schultz study, animals
showed shorter response latencies after presentation of cues
associated with higher reward variance, indicating a higher level
of salience. This behavior was described as risk-seeking, which
is something that has been suggested of similar behaviors in
other settings (McCoy and Platt, 2005; St Onge and Floresco,
2009); however, it ismore easily understood not as a counterintu-
itive preference for risk but rather an attraction to the heightened
salience of these cues.
The second report is a study by Kepecs et al. (2008), in which
rats were trained on a two-choice odor mixture categorization
task. On each trial, two odors (designated A and B) were pre-
sented in conjunction, mixed at one of several possible concen-
tration ratios: 100:0, 68:32, 56:44, 44:56, 32:68, or 0:100. Trials in
which the concentration of odor A was greater than odor B (A >
B) were rewarded for visiting one of the two choice ports,
whereas trials in which the reverse relation held were rewarded
for visiting the other choice port. Not surprisingly, choice errors
increased as a function of how similar the concentration ratios
were. This pattern was reflected by firing in a subpopulation of
OFC neurons, which fired the most on 56:44 trials, followed byNeuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 255
Figure 5. Acquired Salience for Different Degree of Reward Risk or
Uncertainty in the Study by O’Neill and Schultz (2010) or Kepecs
et al. (2008), Respectively, Simulated by the Esber-HaselgroveModel
(A) Simulated acquired salience for three different cues associated with three
different degrees of reward risk in O’Neill and Schultz (2010) by the full Esber-
Haselgrove model. In ‘‘0.27/0.33’’ condition, for example, a cue was equally
associated with either 0.27 ml or 0.33 ml of liquid reward. Risk for the three
cues associated with 0.27/0.33, 0.24/0.36, and 0.18/0.42 are 0.0009, 0.0036,
and 0.0144, respectively. (B) Simulated acquired salience for four different
conditions defined by two different cues and two different behavioral
responses in Kepecs et al. (2008) by the full Esber-Haselgrove model.
‘‘Correct, 44/56,’’ for example, denotes the condition in which subjects made
correct response to obtain liquid reward after presentation of a mixed odor
consisting of 44% of odor A and 56% of odor B.
Neuron
Orbitofrontal Neurons Track Salience68:32 trials, and least on 100:0 trials. Thus, these neurons
seemed to track uncertainty, either in stimulus detection or in
prediction of reward. This quantity was termed decision confi-
dence, since it was related to the rats’ choice behavior, though
the authors noted that the pattern was also consistent with
outcome uncertainty (or risk) (Kepecs et al., 2008, Supplemental
Information, p. 3).
Although decision confidence is an intriguing explanation, the
Esber-Haselgrove model offers an alternative interpretation of
the observed firing pattern. This interpretation rests on the
assumption that variations in stimulus sampling and/or the
distance between the stimulus sample and memory samples
result in the formation of three rather than two different sensory
precepts or states. Whenever the signal is clear, for example,
in the 100:0 mixture, these variations may be assumed to have
a negligible influence on stimulus encoding, and the mixture
will always be correctly encoded as ‘‘A > B’’ (or ‘‘B > A’’ for
0:100). However, as the concentration ratios become more256 Neuron 77, 251–258, January 23, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.similar, these variations will lead to increasingly frequent encod-
ing errors, making the choice more challenging. Thus, for
example, although most 68:32 trials will be correctly encoded
as ‘‘A > B,’’ the variations will cause a proportion of these trials
to be encoded as ‘‘A z B.’’ On ‘‘A z B’’ trials, the rat will be
uncertain as towhich port to visit andwill consequently randomly
distribute its responses across the two choice ports. In the
context of the Esber-Haselgrove model, trials encoded as
‘‘A z B’’ are partially reinforced and therefore should acquire
a higher salience or combined associative strength than trials
encoded as ‘‘A > B,’’ which are continuously reinforced. Criti-
cally, in this behavioral setting, incorrect trials will consist entirely
of highly salient ‘‘Az B’’ trials, whereas correct trials will consist
of a mixture of the highly salient ‘‘Az B’’ trials as well as of the
less salient ‘‘A > B’’ trials. This means that, on average, the
acquired salience on incorrect trials will be higher than that on
correct trials, a prediction that matches the pattern of neural
activity reported by Kepecs et al. (2008) (Figure 5B).
This account is also able to explain why the difference in
activity between correct and incorrect trials is less pronounced
for the 56:44 than the 68:32 mixtures. Sampling variations of
the more challenging 56:44 mixture will translate into a greater
number of these trials being encoded as ‘‘A z B.’’ A higher
proportion of ‘‘A z B’’ trials within correct trials relative to the
68:32mixture will make the average acquired salience on correct
and incorrect trials more similar to one another. Additionally, the
gap in acquired salience between correct and incorrect trials
can be further bridged if it is assumed that a subset of 56:44
incorrect trials consists of (erroneously encoded) ‘‘A < B’’ trials.
The acquired salience of ‘‘A < B’’ trials will be the same as that
of ‘‘A > B’’ trials (and lower than that of ‘‘Az B’’ trials) because
the vast majority of trials encoded as ‘‘A < B’’ are also continu-
ously reinforced in mixtures 0:100, 32:68, and 44:56. Therefore,
the presence of erroneous ‘‘A < B’’ trials will lower the average
salience on incorrect trials for the 56:44 mixture, bringing it
even closer to the average salience on correct trials. Simulations
(Figure 5B) confirmed these predictions of the Esber-Haselgrove
model concerning Kepecs et al. (2008)’s results. Of course, this
account cannot address all of the mechanisms that drive choice
between alternatives; it simply points out that the encoding of
associative relationships embedded in choice situations (as in
Kepecs et al., 2008) may be sufficient to account for certain
aspects of neural activity (see also Bach and Dolan, 2012).
Critically, while the data in these two reports are equally well
explained by risk/uncertainty or acquired salience, this is not
the case for the data in the current study, which included condi-
tions to dissociate predictions of these two models: certain
reward versus certain nonreward and 33% versus 67% reward.
For both of these comparisons, risk/uncertainty predicts no
difference, whereas acquired salience or combined associative
strength should differ. In each case, OFC neurons that were
seemingly sensitive to risky reward show a clear asymmetry in
their neural activity.
Representation of acquired salience provides an account of
the firing of these neurons that is also parsimonious with existing
evidence that the OFC signals information about expected
outcomes (Murray et al., 2007). Notably if outcome signaling in
the OFC contributes to modulating attention or salience, this
Neuron
Orbitofrontal Neurons Track Saliencewould substantially expand the potential role the OFC may play
in associative learning. In fact, there are already hints of such
a role in existing evidence implicating the OFC in latent inhibition
and formation of attentional sets, two behaviors often taken as
cardinal evidence for experiential declines in salience (Chase
et al., 2012; Schiller and Weiner, 2004; Schiller et al., 2006).
Additionally, it has been shown recently that the OFC is required
for rapid learning when cue-outcome relationships are changing
by enabling the credit for a particular outcome to be assigned
to a specific choice of a cue that leads to the outcome (‘‘credit
assignment’’) (Walton et al., 2010). If salience were not being
properly allocated, this might result in improper credit assign-
ment in such changeable environment.
Of course, like claims that OFC neurons signal risk, uncer-
tainty, or even decision confidence, the proposal that the OFC
signals acquired salience is a hypothesis that needs to be further
tested. However, this hypothesis does make concrete predic-
tions. For example, similar signaling may be evident in down-
stream areas, a prediction that has recently been met for the
temporoparietal junction (Kahnt et al., 2012; Kahnt and Tobler,
2013). Additionally, if the OFC contributes to experiential
increases in salience, then the OFC should be necessary for
the more rapid discrimination learning observed when cues
have previously been paired with uncertain reward (Haselgrove
et al., 2010). Similarly, given the observation of increases in firing
for both higher and lower salience, OFC might also be important
for behaviors that reflect a decline in salience. Indeed this may
be reflected in the existing results implicating the OFC in latent
inhibition and set formation described above. Our data may
provide a neurophysiological substrate to explain these results.
This explanation would have relevance to understanding the
involvement of OFC dysfunction in neuropsychiatric disorders
that involve aberrant behavior and learning, such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Rauch et al., 1994), schizophrenia (Corlett
et al., 2007), and addiction (Lucantonio et al., 2012).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Male Long-Evans rats (Charles River, 350–450 g) were housed individually on
a 12 hr light/dark cycle with ad libidum access to food. Water was restricted
to that earned as reward in the task and to 10 min free access after each
testing session. Procedures were conducted at the University of Maryland
School of Medicine in accordance with University and NIH guidelines.
Surgical and Single-Unit Recording Procedures
Procedures were as described previously (Roesch et al., 2006), except that
the current experiment utilized drivable stereotrodes (Ramus and Eichen-
baum, 2000). Bundles were implanted at 3.6 mm anterior to bregma,
3.2 mm laterally, and 3.2 mm ventral to the brain surface. Prior to implanta-
tion, wires were cut with surgical scissors to extend 1.5 mm beyond the
cannula and electroplated with platinum (H2PtCl6, Aldrich) to an impedance
of 300 kOhm. Cephalexin (15 mg/kg per oral) was administered twice daily
for 2 weeks postoperatively to prevent infection. At the end of recording, the
final electrode position was marked. The rats were euthanized and their
brains were processed for histology using standard techniques. Neural
activity was recorded using Multichannel Acquisition Processor systems
(Plexon). Waveforms (>2.5:1 signal-to-noise) were extracted from active
channels and recorded to disk by an associated workstation with event
timestamps from the behavior computer. Units were sorted later using Offline
Sorter software (Plexon). Sorted files were then processed in Neuroexplorerto extract unit timestamps and relevant event markers for analysis in MAT-
LAB 2012a (MathWorks).
Behavioral Task
Recording was conducted in aluminum chambers 18’’ on each side. A central
odor port was located above a fluid well connected to an air flow dilution
olfactometer to allow the rapid delivery of olfactory cues. Task control was
implemented via computer; port entry and licking was monitored by photo-
beams. One of four different odors (Auralva, Para-isopropyl hydratropic alde-
hyde, Camekol DH, or Verbena oliffac) was presented on each trial, associated
with 100%, 67%, 33%, or 0%probability of reward. After odor offset, rats were
required to make a response at the fluid well within 100 s. In other words, rats
had to wait 100 s for the task to proceed if they did not respond at the fluid well.
In a rewarded trial, a 0.1 ml bolus of 10% sucrose solution was delivered 1 s
after well entry. The house light was turned off when rats left the fluid well
after reward consumption. In a nonrewarded trial, the house light was turned
off 1 s after the entry. Rats did not need to wait for 1 s in the well; all that
was required for the task to proceed was a response at the well. Rats were
trained for 4 weeks prior to the start of recording, such that they responded
on all rewarded trials and >99.0%of the trials in which the odor associatedwith
0% reward is presented.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes two figures, two tables, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.006.
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